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 In the Public Interest? A Comparative Analysis of Norway and EU 
GMO Regulations 
 
Apolline Roger* 
 
The European Commission, when deciding whether the cultivation and use of 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs) should be authorized on European Union 
(EU) territory, has always limited its decision to safety considerations. Dissatisfied, 
Member States required the adoption of the ‘GMO Package’. Its first application, 
Directive 2015/412, gives Member States the same opportunity that was already 
offered to Norway under the EEA Agreement. It allows them to invoke social grounds 
to opt out of EU authorizations, but maintains the competence of the EU institutions 
over safety issues. The interpretation of the Directive promises to be contentious. 
How and to what extent may the Member States use the new provisions to open a 
debate on when authorizing a GMO is in the public interest? Learning from the 
Norwegian authorities that have done so since 1994, this article offers insights both 
on the Norwegian system and on the potential of the new Directive. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Genetically modified organisms (GMOs) are now widely used. In 2013, GMOs, 
mostly cotton, maize and soy, were cultivated on 174 million hectares of land. 
Genetically modified (GM) soybeans occupy 79 percent of the world soy production 
surface.1 This change in agricultural practices is generally regulated. Many countries 
decided to submit genetically modified organisms (GMOs) to a pre-market 
authorization at the national level2 and to cooperate on the matter at the international 
level.3 The identification of which GMOs can be released into nature and society has 
therefore been recognized not only as a matter of public interest but also as requiring 
the intervention of public authorities. 
 
For a researcher in law, but more generally for social scientists, this situation raises 
important questions typical of the integration of new and ethically sensitive 
technologies in society. One of them is the way public authorities define what is in the 
‘public interest’ in relation to new technology; the public interest that pre-release 
authorization procedures are deemed to protect. Indeed, the way public interest is 
defined, implicitly or explicitly, shapes the objective, scope and ambition of the 
regulation. It is therefore the core of the regulation and, as such, should be clearly 
identified, thoroughly debated and democratically agreed upon. 
                                                
* Corresponding author. 
Email: Apolline.Roger@ed.ac.uk 
1See GMOcompass, ‘Genetically Modified Plants: Global Cultivation on 174 Hectares’ (2013), found 
at: <http://www.gmo-
compass.org/eng/agri_biotechnology/gmo_planting/257.global_gm_planting_2013.html>. 
2 Even though these regulations display very different characteristics. See L. Bodiguel and M. Cardwell 
(eds.), The Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms: Comparative Approaches (Oxford 
University Press, 2010), see also J. A. Heinemann, S. Zanon Agapito-Tenfen and J.A. Carmand, ‘A 
Comparative Evaluation of the Regulation of GM Crops or Products Containing dsRNA and Suggested 
Improvements to Risk Assessments’, 55 Environment International (2013), 43; and L. Krämer, 
‘Genetically Modified Living Organisms and the Precautionary Principle’ (TestBiotech, 2013). 
3 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity (Cartagena, 29 January 
2000; in force 11 September 2003). 
  
Today, most countries limit the assessment of GMOs to the risks they might present 
for health and the environment. The release of a GMO considered as ‘safe’ is 
therefore assumed to be in the public interest.4 The protection against physical harm is 
undoubtedly of primary importance, and the breadth and depth of the regulation on 
this matter should be carefully designed. Yet, when the decision to authorize a GMO 
event5 is based purely on safety, the socio-economic, cultural and ethical dimensions 
of the release of GMOs into society are ignored, even though these aspects are 
essential. Indeed, most GMOs are technological applications meant to change two 
fundamental areas of human societies: agriculture and the food chain, keystones of 
environmental and social balance, of survival, health, culture and well-being. What is 
in the interest of society, or ‘public interest’, is therefore much wider than the 
protection from physical harm when it comes to GMOs. It also encompasses a debate 
of their impact on, for example: 
 
• the quality, quantity and diversity of food;	  
• the cultural perceptions and preferences related to food, and the right to choose;	  
• the preservation and promotion of sustainable agriculture, i.e. agriculture 
capable of performing its multiple social, productive and environmental 
functions in the context of increasing environmental and land-use pressures, 
growing population and climate change;	  
• the power dynamics in the agriculture and food sectors;	  
• the preservation of rural communities;	  
• the preservation of the farmers’ involvement in scientific innovation, the right to 
science, access to seeds, and the protection of traditional knowledge.	  
 
The impact of a given GMO event or trait on these aspects can be null, negative or 
positive and is often, in practice, an intricate mix of all of these. The considerable 
weakness of regulations focused on safety is the voluntary blind spot they create 
towards the potential societal disturbances caused, which are fully ignored. The other 
consequence of this orientation is the abortion of a debate on the societal benefits. The 
problem is that if it is assumed that the producers of GMOs receive economic benefits 
from their commercialization, assuming wider societal benefits seems a rather 
excessive shortcut. This is especially the case when looking at the mounting evidence 
challenging the existence of the long-term benefits of GMOs use for farmers and the 
environment.6 Against this backdrop, this article argues that GMO regulation should 
address the abovementioned blind spot and question the associated underlying 
assumptions. 
 
                                                
4 See P.B. Thompson, ‘Ethics and Equity’, in: K. Ludlow, S.J. Smyth and J. Falck-Zepeda (eds.), 
Socio-economic Considerations in Biotechnology Regulation (Springer, 2014), 97; M. Lee, ‘Beyond 
Safety? The Broadening Scope of Risk Regulation’, 62:1 Current Legal Problems (2009), 242; and L. 
Levidow and S. Carr ‘How Biotechnology Regulation Sets a Risk/Ethics Boundary’, 14:1 Agriculture 
and Human Values (1997), 29. 
5  ‘When scientists develop transgenic plants, plant cells are transformed with foreign DNA 
individually. Every cell that successfully incorporates the gene of interest represents a unique “event”. 
Marker genes are used to identify transformed cells, and each resulting transgenic plant is the result of 
one event’. See <http://www.gmo-compass.org/eng/glossary/>. When more than one gene is 
transferred the GMO is called a ‘stacked event’. 
6 See T. Kaphengst et al., Final Report. Assessment of the Economic Performance of GM Crops 
Worldwide (Ecologic Institute, 2011). 
 However, the complexity of a more holistic approach also has to be taken into 
account. As Maria Lee rightly states, ‘[i]ntegrating social and ethical perspectives into 
innovation and its regulation is actually rather daunting’.7 Several studies have 
established the necessity to address considerations beyond risk, 8  but have not 
proposed how the legal framework can be designed to support such an approach. This 
article seeks to contribute to the construction of a regulatory toolkit that could be used 
to make GMO regulation an instrument to steer innovation towards sustainable 
agriculture. 
 
Because of the complexity of the process proposed, it is assumed that there is a need 
to learn from the legal orders with experience on this matter, while carefully 
considering the specificities of each social and legal culture. The objective is therefore 
not to develop a theory laying down the basis of a universal model, but to exploit the 
richness of the comparative method in order to identify best practices and evaluate 
their relevance as inspiration for another legal order. 
 
Such an approach is particularly needed at this time within the European Union (EU) 
legal order, in light of Directive 2015/412,9 and more generally the recent adoption of 
the new GMO Package.10 This legislation, the details of which will be set out below, 
aims at giving Member States the possibility to opt out on social grounds from 
authorizations granted at the EU level. In the coming months, Member States will 
therefore have to refine their interpretation of the package in order to define their 
internal GMO policies in conformity with EU law. This process promises to be 
complex, especially if they intend to adopt an ambitious interpretation of their new 
power in order to address both the societal impacts and the societal benefits of GMOs. 
However, learning from the Norwegian experience might facilitate the process. 
 
First, Norway is a pioneer in the holistic assessment of GMOs, assessing both their 
physical and social impacts since 1993.11 Second, it has developed an innovative way 
to evaluate the societal benefits of GMOs. Third, Norway is partially subject to the 
EU GMO regulation framework that Member States have to respect. 12 An interesting 
                                                
7 See M. Lee, n. 4 above, at 279. 
8 Ibid.; see also M. Lee, EU Regulation of GMOs: Law and Decision Making for a New Technology 
(Edward Elgar, 2008); M. Kritikos, ‘Traditional Risk Analysis and Releases of GMOs into the 
European Union: Space for Non-scientific Factors?’, 34:3 European Law Review (2009), 405; A. Spök, 
Assessing Socio-Economic Impacts of GMOs: Issues to Consider for Policy Development (German 
Ministry of Health, 2010); D. Du, ‘Rethinking Risks: Should Socioeconomic and Ethical 
Considerations Be Incorporated into the Regulation of Genetically Modified Crops?’, 26:1 Harvard 
Journal of Law & Technology (2012), 376. 
9 Directive 2015/412/EU of 11 March 2015 Amending Directive 2001/18/EC as Regards the Possibility 
for the Member States to Restrict or Prohibit the Cultivation of Genetically Modified Organisms 
(GMOs) in Their Territory, [2015] OJ L68/1. 
10 Commission Proposal of 22 April 2015 for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council Amending Regulation 1829/2003 as Regards the Possibility for the Member States to Restrict 
or Prohibit the Use of Genetically Modified Food and Feed on Their Territory, COM(2015) 177 
(‘Commission Proposal’). 
11 Norway was joined later by France; see http://www.hautconseildesbiotechnologies.fr/en>. 
12 Directive 2001/18/EC of 12 March 2001 on the Deliberate Release into the Environment of 
Genetically Modified Organisms and Repealing Council Directive 90/220/EEC, [2001] OJ L106/1, is 
applicable to Norway as a member of the European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement. The application 
of Directive 2001/18 relies on a compromise similar to the one that was later taken up by the new 
Package: Norway remains free to reject the authorizations on the basis of concerns other than health 
 parallel can therefore be drawn. This article intends to examine whether Member 
States have something to learn from the Norwegian approach while considering if the 
limits of their competence under EU law will allow them to do so. 
 
The Norwegian model is often mentioned13 and has been the object of academic 
attention.14 However, the few legal analyses available in English only offer a limited 
overview of the legislation.15 This research therefore adds to the available literature 
by synthesizing the main legal characteristics of the Norwegian model. It also 
complements the first academic reactions to the GMO Package16 by assessing whether 
it will allow Member States to steer innovation towards sustainable agriculture. More 
generally, it aims at contributing to the identification of a regulatory framework 
capable of enabling and guiding public authorities when they intend to steer 
responsible innovation. 
 
The article begins by explaining the most interesting feature of the Norwegian model, 
i.e. the utilization of a ‘test’ verifying whether the assessed GMO is needed by society 
to achieve sustainable development in general and sustainable agriculture in 
particular, both in Norway and beyond. It then exposes the tensions in the objectives 
of the Package, whose provisions give a considerable amount of leeway to Member 
States while trying to guide them towards a restrictive interpretation in order to 
protect the functioning of the market and of the authorization process. The article next 
sheds light on the underlying assumptions behind the EU and Norwegian legislation, 
which are reflected in a different conception of the role of public authorities towards 
GMOs. The article proceeds to explore whether, despite these different assumptions, a 
                                                                                                                                      
and environment. See Decision of the EEA Joint Committee No 127/2007 of 28 September 2007 
amending Annex XX to the EEA Agreement, [2008] OJ L47/58, Article 1. 
13 See, e.g., L. Krämer, n. 2 above; A. Spök, n. 8 above; K. Ludlow, S.J. Smyth and J. Falck-Zepeda, 
‘Introduction to Socio-Economic Considerations in the Regulation of Genetically Modified 
Organisms’, in: K. Ludlow et al., n. 4 above, 3; J. Husby ‘Sustainability, Social and Ethical 
Considerations in Regulations’, in: T. Traavik and L. Ching (eds.), Biosafety First – Holistic 
Approaches to Risk and Uncertainty in Genetic Engineering and Genetically Modified Organisms 
(Tapir Academic Press 2009). 
14  See G.K. Rosendal, Competing Knowledge Claims and GMO Assessment by the Norwegian 
Biotechnology Advisory Board (Fridtjof Nansen Institute, 2007) (‘G.K. Rosendal, 2007’), at 4; V. 
Kvakkestad and A. Vatn, ‘Regulating the Release of GMOs: Contrasts between the European Union 
and Norway’, 26:5 Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy (2008), 968; O.K. Fauchald, 
‘Genetically Modified Organisms and Precaution in Norwegian Law’, in: N. De Sadeleer (ed.), 
Implementing the Precautionary Principle (Earthscan 2012), 229; G.K. Rosendal, ‘Interpreting 
Sustainable Development and Societal Utility in Norwegian GMO Assessments’, 18:4 European 
Environment (2003), 243 (‘G.K. Rosendal, 2003’); A.I. Myhr and T. Traavik, ‘Sustainable 
Development and Norwegian Genetic Engineering Regulations: Applications, Impacts and 
Challenges’, 16:4 Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics (2003), 317. 
15 See O.K. Fauchald, n. 14 above. 
16 M. Dobbs ‘Legalising General Prohibitions on Cultivation of Genetically Modified Organisms’, 
11:12 German Law Journal (2010), 1347; L. Moore Smith ‘Divided We Fall: The Shortcomings of the 
European Union’s Proposal for Independent Member States to Regulate the Cultivation of Genetically 
Modified Organisms’, 33:3 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law (2012), 841; M. 
Weimer, ‘What Price Flexibility: The Recent Commission Proposal to Allow for National Opt-Outs on 
GMO Cultivation under the Deliberate Release Directive and the Comitology Reform Post-Lisbon’, 
1:4 European Food and Feed Law Review (2011), 232, M. Geelhoed, ‘A Growing Impasse: the Future 
of the EU’s GMO Regime’ (University of Edinburgh, 2014), page 18; M. Lee, ‘GMOS in the Internal 
Market: New Legislation on National Flexibility’ (on file with author); M. Weimer, ‘Risk Regulation 
and Deliberation in EU Administrative Governance – GMO Regulation and Its Reform’, European 
Law Journal (2015, forthcoming). 
 Member State could exploit the margin of appreciation granted by the Package to 
adopt the innovative ‘tests’ developed by Norway. The article concludes by drawing 
lessons from a difficulty experienced by Norway that will probably be faced by 
Member States: the lack of data. 
 
THE NORWEGIAN SOCIAL ASSESSMENT: A TOOL TO SELECT 
SUSTAINABLE GMOs 
 
In Norway, the regulatory framework distinguishes GMOs according to their nature 
(living or non-living17). The importation and production of living GMOs are regulated 
by the Gene Technology Act (GTA).18 The regulation of ‘non-living’ GMOs depends 
on their utilization. Processed food19 and feed20 are dealt with by the Food and the 
Feed Regulations.21 The import of non-living GMOs for industrial use or of a final 
non-food product derived from GMOs (e.g. a T-shirt made with GM cotton) is not 
submitted to a specific pre-market authorization.22 
 
Only the GTA requires the assessment of the social dimension of GMOs’ 
authorization. The other regulations are limited to safety, even though their 
implementation might be influenced by the GTA’s holistic approach, which takes into 
account the physical and social impacts of GMOs.23 The following therefore focuses 
on the GTA, in order to identify its definition of the public interest as reflected by its 
objective and by the criteria used to implement it. 
 
THE OBJECTIVE OF THE GTA: STEERING INNOVATION TOWARDS 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
 
                                                
17 A ‘living’ organism is capable of transferring material and of replicating. 
18 Act of 2 April 1993 No. 38 Relating to the Production and Use of Genetically Modified Organisms 
(‘GTA’), found at: <https://www.regjeringen.no/en/dokumenter/gene-technology-act/id173031/>. 
19 General Regulations Relating to the Production and Marketing of Foodstuffs (‘Generell forskrift for 
produksjon og omsetning mv. av næringsmidler’) (1983), found at: 
<https://lovdata.no/dokument/SF/forskrift/1983-07-08-
1252?q=generell+forskrift+for+produksjon+og>. 
20  Regulations on Feedstuff (‘Forskrift om fôrvarer’) (2002), found at: 
<https://lovdata.no/dokument/SF/forskrift/2002-11-07-1290>. 
21 The Food and Feed Regulations implement the Food Act (‘Matloven’), full name ‘Act on Food 
Production and Food Safety (‘Lov om matproduksjon og mattrygghet mv.’) (2003), found at: 
<https://lovdata.no/dokument/NL/lov/2003-12-19-124?q=matloven>. 
22They are not distinguished from products not derived from GMOs. See the explanation on the website 
of the Norwegian: Biotechnology Advisory Board (in Norwegian), found at: 
<http://www.bioteknologiradet.no/temaer/genmodifiserte-planter-og-mat/regelverk>. Under EU law, 
only non-food products derived from GMO benefit from such an exception. 
23 Before the modification of the Food and Feed Regulations in 2005, 19 feedstuffs could enter the 
Norwegian market because the authorizations given by the EU under Directive 90/220/EEC of 23 April 
1990 on the deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified organisms [1990] OJ L 117 
were applicable through the EEA agreement. After the three-years transition period, it was possible to 
obtain a one-year derogation from the obligation to ask an authorization under the Food and Feed 
Regulations for ‘special circumstances’ (see Regulations on Feedstuff, n. 20 above, Section 24). The 
exemption was allowed every year from 2005 to 2014. However, in 2014, the Norwegian Food 
Security Authority refused to grant the exemption, considering that there was no ‘real need’ for such 
feedstuff. See 
<http://www.mattilsynet.no/planter_og_dyrking/genmodifisering/bakgrunn_for_avslag_om_aa_bruke_
genmodifisert_fiskefor.16613> (in Norwegian). No processed food or feedstuff has been authorized on 
the Norwegian market since. 
 The purpose of the GTA is to ensure that the production and use of GMOs ‘take place 
in an ethically justifiable and socially acceptable manner, in accordance with the 
principle of sustainable development and without adverse effect on health and the 
environment’.24 Safety is therefore rather part of the expected result, which also has to 
be in line with societal values and with the political orientation towards sustainable 
development. The aim is not to reject biotechnologies, but to sort out which of their 
applications are worth accepting in light of their impacts on, and contribution to, 
sustainable agriculture. The GTA therefore intends to steer responsible innovation, as 
shown by the aim of the Act’s proposal: to ‘ensure that modern biotechnology is 
utilized for the common good’.25 
 
This holistic approach to public interest is confirmed by the weight given to social 
concerns in the final decision. The GTA affirms that when taking their decision, the 
competent authorities26 have an obligation to give ‘considerable weight’ ‘to whether 
the deliberate release will be of benefit to society and is likely to promote sustainable 
development’.27 As a result, social and safety assessments are given equal importance. 
They are both systematically conducted to inform the final decision. Furthermore, 
social grounds, like safety ones, can be used as stand-alone grounds to refuse to grant 
an authorization28. The Ministry for the Environment could therefore, on the one 
hand, decide to prohibit the use of a GMO presenting no risk but whose use or 
production is not socially justifiable. However, so far this has not happened, and such 
a decision would probably be reserved for extreme cases.29 On the other hand, a 
positive social assessment might support a more flexible application of the strict 
requirement of Section 10 of the GTA30 requiring ‘no risk’ of adverse effects on 
health or the environment. Indeed, if a GMO presents a very low risk, this risk can be 
deemed acceptable because of very high societal benefits. 
 
The institutions set up by the GTA confirm that social and safety assessments equally 
contribute to the final decision. Indeed, two ‘mirror’ advisory bodies were created: 
one in charge of the safety assessment, the other of the social assessment (the 
Norwegian Biotechnology Advisory Board (NBAB))31. Both assessments are seen as 
requiring the same efforts in terms of data gathering, checking and synthezising.32 
The GTA, therefore, does not abide by the reductionist presentation of safety grounds 
                                                
24 GTA, n. 18 above, Section 1. 
25 Norwegian Biotechnology Advisory Board (NBAB), Sustainability, Benefit to the Community and 
Ethics in the Assessment of Genetically Modified Organisms: Implementation of the Concepts set out in 
Sections 1 and 10 of the Norwegian Gene Technology Act, 2nd edn (2009), found at: 
<http://www.bion.no/filarkiv/2010/07/2009_11_18_diskusjonsnotat_baerekraft_engelsk.pdf>, at 17. 
26 More precisely, the Ministry of the Environment, upon the recommendation of the Directorate for 
Nature Management, which coordinates the decision making process. See G.K. Rosendal, 2007, n. 14 
above. 
27 GTA, n. 18 above, Section 11. 
28 Ibid., Section 10. This was confirmed by the NBAB guidance; see NBAB, n. 25 above. 
29 See G.K. Rosendal, 2003, n. 14 above; and G.K. Rosendal, 2007, n. 14 above; see also V. 
Kvakkestad and A. Vatn, n. 14 above; A.I. Myhr and T. Traavik, n. 14 above; and G.K. Rosendal, 
‘Societal Utility and Sustainable Development’ (Directorate for Nature Management, 2009). 
30 See NBAB, n. 25 above, at 6. 
31 <http://www.bioteknologiradet.no/english/>. 
32 See NBAB, n. 25 above, which highlights the lack of available information; and A. Spök, n. 8 above, 
explaining the controversies around social data. See also T. Kaphengst et al., n. 6 above, for a meta-
analysis of the literature and an explanation of the gaps (lack of knowledge, uncertainties) currently left 
open in social data. 
 as ‘scientific’ and social grounds as ‘non-scientific’. The Norwegian system 
recognizes that it is impossible for competent authorities to form an opinion on the 
complex social issues at stake without the support of experts from social and natural 
sciences. Furthermore, the composition of the NBAB reflects that expertise is not 
possessed solely by scientists. A minority of relevant stakeholders also bring their 
knowledge and experience to the table.33 As a result, the NBAB enjoys a very high 
level of legitimacy and trust from the public.34 
 
The GTA therefore aims at steering biotechnology innovation towards sustainable 
development, by requiring the competent authorities to give equal attention to social 
and safety concerns, and by giving them the appropriate institutional support to do so. 
However, the GTA remains silent on the exact interpretation to be given to the very 
malleable concepts used to formulate its objectives: ‘sustainable development’, 
‘ethics’ and ‘social acceptability’. Considering that the social assessment informs and 
frames the final decision, the way the objectives of the GTA are translated in 
assessment criteria is absolutely fundamental. 
 
THE ASSESSMENT CRITERIA 
 
Being in charge of the social assessment, the NBAB had to quickly develop 
operational criteria to fulfil its task. These criteria were published in the NBAB 2000 
guidance document35 and later enacted in the 2005 Regulation Relating to Impact 
Assessment Pursuant to the Gene Technology Act (IAR).36 Appendix 4 of the IAR 
now lists the five criteria framing the assessment: 
 
• Risks of adverse effects on the environment and on human & animal health;	  
• Precautionary principle;	  
• Sustainable development;	  
• Societal benefits; and	  
• Ethical considerations.	  
 
                                                
33 This is why the 15 members of the NBAB include stakeholder representatives (including from 
nongovernmental organizations and political parties), even though the majority is composed of 
scientists from relevant fields of research both from natural sciences (medicine, biology, etc.) and 
social sciences (philosophy, ethics, political sciences, law). France adopted a similar model in the 
composition of the ‘Comité économique, éthique et social’, the ‘social chamber’ of the ‘Haut Conseil 
des Biotechnologies’ in charge of delivering a social and a natural assessment of GMO to the 
competent authority. However, the majority of this committee consists of stakeholders rather than 
academics. See <http://www.hautconseildesbiotechnologies.fr/spip.php?rubrique20> (in French). 
34 See G.K. Rosendal, 2003, n. 14 above; and G.K. Rosendal, 2007, n. 14 above; see also the NBAB’s 
affirmation in its opinion of 4 July 2013  
on the importation of 27 GM maize, found at: 
<http://www.bioteknologiradet.no/filarkiv/uttalelser/Sluttbehandling_GMOmais_import_Bioteknologi
nemnda.pdf> (in Norwegian). Furthermore, the procedure adds another legitimizing mechanism by 
requiring public participation before the final decision is made. See A.I. Myhr and T. Traavik, n. 14 
above. 
35 This first guidance document was later confirmed by the slightly updated version referred to in n. 25 
above. 
36 Regulation Relating to Impact Assessment Pursuant to the Gene Technology Act (‘Forskrift om 
konsekvensutredning etter genteknologiloven’) (2005) found at: 
<https://www.regjeringen.no/en/dokumenter/impact-assessment/id440455/>. The English version of 
the Regulation seems to be different on some points from the NBAB guidance document, but this is 
due to translation and not to a real difference in the meaning. 
 These criteria are directly derived from the objectives of Section 1 of the GTA, from 
Section 11 setting the ‘requirements relating to approval’, and from the aim of the Act 
as discussed by the parliament. Importantly, the IAR did not opt for a substantive and 
precise definition of each criterion, but rather for an indicative list of questions 
revealing how they should be understood and ‘tested’. 
 
The first and second criteria emphasize how interlinked the social and physical 
dimensions of public interest are and how important the communication between the 
respective expert bodies is. The first one obliges the NBAB to take due consideration 
of the safety assessment results. The second refers to the precautionary principle as an 
epistemological framework. The more clouded by uncertainties the safety 
assumptions are, the more the applicants will have to demonstrate the utility of the 
GMO for society. 
 
Criteria 3 and 5 are explicitly included in Section 1 of the GTA as the objectives of 
the legislation. As social assessment criteria, they mostly provide guidance on the 
scope of the assessment. Criterion 3 – the ‘sustainable development test’ –leads the 
authorities to examine both short- and long-term impacts of GMOs, within Norway 
and beyond. The appropriate balance between social and environmental protection 
and economic development is therefore understood as a fair intergenerational and 
intra-generational distribution of the burdens and advantages of GMOs. 
Complementing this approach, criterion 5 – the ‘ethics test’ – insists on the 
importance of giving special attention to weaker groups, in particular indigenous 
people, and to relevant societal values.37 
 
Criterion 4 – the ‘societal benefits test’ – involves two stages. The first one is typical 
of all socio-economic impact assessment (SEIA) procedures; the second one is the 
most innovative feature of the GTA. The first step requires comparing the anticipated 
economic gains induced by the production and use of the GMO with its adverse 
impacts on existing production. The process of comparing the anticipated negative 
and positive impacts of an activity in order to authorize only the predominantly 
beneficial ones is not new. It is at the core of the procedures of environmental impact 
assessment and even of the regulatory impact assessment used at the EU level as a 
tool of ‘simplification’ of the acquis. 
 
However, the second step of the Norwegian ‘societal benefits test’ distinguishes it 
from more classical SEIAs. It goes beyond the analysis of the GMOs’ societal 
impacts by checking whether there is a societal need for the GMOs. The focus is 
therefore not on the consequences of the GMO but on its usefulness. It can be quite 
difficult to define when a GMO event is ‘needed’ by society. In economics, the 
market is used as a reliable indicator; demand equals need. The NBAB recognizes this 
by checking whether demand for the characteristics of the product exists. However, 
the checklist does not stop here and also asks the following questions: ‘will the 
product solve or possibly contribute to solving a societal problem?’; and ‘is the 
product significantly better than equivalent products already on the market?’ 
 
                                                
37 The tests are not strictly separated; global and ethical concerns can be included in the reflection on 
the societal benefits even though it is primarily concerned with the Norwegian situation. 
 The objective of the ‘societal benefits tests’ therefore goes beyond the satisfaction of 
a potential demand on the market. The aim is to identify and promote the best 
technical solutions, i.e. those supporting the ‘best’ sustainable development in general 
and sustainable agriculture in particular. The inclusion of this ‘best sustainable 
alternative’ test in the social assessment is a game-changer compared to more 
classical SEIAs. 
 
To illustrate, let’s imagine the application of such an approach to the authorization of 
a quarry. A classical SEIA would evaluate on the one hand the creation of jobs and 
the opportunities for the local shops to benefit from the arrival of workers (societal 
benefits). On the other hand, it would consider the social disturbances linked to the 
noise, traffic and pollution and the potential impact on, for example, tourism (societal 
impacts). A broad SEIA might also include the cultural significance of the site 
(ethical and cultural test). A ‘best sustainable alternative’ test would, however, 
question not only the impact but also the necessity of the project: can the current 
needs be satisfied by existing quarries? Can recycled materials be used instead of the 
raw material? Do existing policy objectives push towards the preferential use of 
recycled materials? It is therefore a way to link the individual decision with the 
current and future needs of society, appreciated in the light of sustainable 
development as a policy objective. 
 
What has the result of the social assessment been in practice? Since its creation, the 
NBAB has concluded that the assessed GMOs were not needed by society.38 These 
conclusions were motivated, for example, by the fact that the assessed GMO was not 
used and demanded in Norway,39 such as when the pest a GMO was made to fight 
was not a problem on the Norwegian territory.40 Another motivation was that the 
product was not significantly better than conventional alternatives,41 for example 
because the trait gained by genetic modification was already available through natural 
breeding.42 The NBAB has also considered certain GMO events as not needed where 
they required cultivation practices that appeared less sustainable than more 
comprehensive strategies to combat pests and weeds.43 In particular, a plant modified 
to be used with a chemical identified as risky, or as dangerous and already banned, 
like glufosinate ammonium, was especially considered as not contributing to 
sustainable agriculture.44 Interestingly, this decision did not deal with an authorization 
                                                
38 See V. Kvakkestad and A. Vatn, n. 14 above. 
39 This argument was used to reject several of the authorizations given by the EU under Directive 
90/220, which preceded Directive 2001/18 and was applicable to Norway; see, for more detail, V. 
Kvakkestad and A. Vatn, n. 14 above. 
40 See, e.g., the opinion of the NBAB on the authorization of Bt Maize 1507 (2013), found at: 
<http://www.bioteknologiradet.no/filarkiv/2013/12/Sluttbehandling_EFSA_CS_01_01_mais_1507_Bi
oteknologinemnda.pdf> (in Norwegian). 
41 See V. Kvakkestad and A. Vatn, n. 14 above. 
42  This was the case for the Amflora potato; see the NBAB opinion (2010), found at: 
<http://www.bioteknologiradet.no/filarkiv/2010/10/2010_10_04_amflora_dyrking_industri_dn.pdf> 
(in Norwegian). 
43 See, e.g., the opinion of the NBAB on the authorization of Bt Maize 1507, n. 40 above. 
44 Ibid. See also the response by the Norwegian government to the socio-economic questionnaire of the 
European Commission, which defended the same conclusion concerning Maize T 25 (15 January 
2010), found at: <http://ec.europa.eu/food/plant/docs/plant_gmo-socio-economic_considerations-
norway_contribution_en.pdf>; and the NBAB’s opinion about 27 GM Maize (2013), found at: 
<http://www.bioteknologiradet.no/filarkiv/uttalelser/Sluttbehandling_GMOmais_import_Bioteknologi
nemnda.pdf> (in Norwegian). 
 to cultivate, but to import. Even though the farming practices did not directly affect 
the Norwegian territory, authorizing a product grown in another country from 
agricultural practices using a chemical banned in Norway was seen as an ethically 
wrong double standard. 
 
On the other hand, it has also been accepted that even when the social assessment 
concludes that the GMO event is not needed by society, it could be authorized if it is 
reasonably certain that it presents no foreseeable risk.45 This was the case for several 
cut flowers authorized for importation under Directive 2001/18,46 which is applicable 
in Norway. However, the Norwegian authorities have not always followed the EU. 
Ten times they have used their right to reject the EU authorizations given under 
Directive 2001/18.47 The reasons invoked were, however, mostly linked to safety and 
not to social concerns. Indeed, while no living or processed GM food and feed is 
currently allowed on the Norwegian territory, it is mostly because, contrary to the 
European Food Safety Authority, Norway considers that the health risks associated 
with the use of antibiotic gene markers are high enough to justify a ban.48 
 
To conclude, the criteria cover all aspects of the integration of GMOs in society and 
help define what is considered in the public interest. The ambition is set high, since 
the effects included in the assessment are those felt both locally and globally, in the 
short and long term. The ‘best sustainable alternative’ test is a core feature of the 
Norwegian social assessment. It goes beyond the identification of the positive and 
adverse impacts by investigating whether society needs the GMO event/trait. After 
this exploration of the Norwegian system, the way the new European package defines 
public interest can be analysed to enable a comparison. 
 
SOCIAL ASSESSMENT UNDER DIRECTIVE 2015/412: A TOOL 
CONSTRAINED BY COMPETING OBJECTIVES 
 
The two-tiered ‘GMO package’ is the most recent of numerous attempts to build an 
efficient and legitimate GMO governance system within the EU. The first tier of the 
                                                
45 See G.K. Rosendal, 2007, n. 14 above, at 22-23. Eleven cut carnations were authorized for import, 
despite the fact that the NBAB found an absence of utility for Norwegian Society, because of the 
absence of risk. See also V. Kvakkestad and A. Vatn, n. 14 above; and B.R. Heide, ‘Socio-economic 
Considerations in Decision-making on LMOs: Experiences from Norway’, presentation at Cartagena 
Protocol Workshop (14-16 November 2012), found at: 
<http://bch.cbd.int/protocol/socioeconomics/presentations/norway.pdf>. 
46 Directive 2001/18/EC, n. 12 above, recitals 9, 58 and 60. 
47 See V. Kvakkestad and A. Vatn, n. 14 above, for data from 2012. Since then, two carnations have 
been authorized in 2015 under the Directive and will probably not be rejected by Norway, which 
already has authorized a lot of carnations. The only other authorization (for the Amflora potato) was 
rejected in Norway in 2013. See see 
<http://www.miljødirektoratet.no/no/Nyheter/Nyheter/Nyhetsarkiv/2011/5/DN-sier-nei-til-GMO-
potet/> (in Norwegian). This was the same year the authorization given at EU level was invalidated by: 
CJEU, Case T-240/10, Hungary v. Commission ECLI:EU:T:2013:645. 
48 The Norwegian parliament took a clear stand on this after several opinions of the scientific 
committee. The result can be seen in the Regulation Prohibiting Certain Kind of Genetically Modified 
Foodstuff and Foodstuff Ingredients (‘Forskift om forbid mot visse genmodifiserte næringsmidler og 
næringsmiddelingredienser’) (2000) found at: <https://lovdata.no/dokument/SF/forskrift/2000-03-04-
257>, Section 1: ‘It is forbidden to produce, import and sell food and food ingredients that contain 
genes coding for antibiotic resistance where these genes are introduced by genetic modification and can 
be detected in the final product.’ Regulations on Feedstuff, n. 20 above, Section 8, contains a similar 
prohibition. 
 package, Directive 2015/412, was adopted recently to amend Directive 2001/18 on 
the deliberate release of GMOs into the environment. It gives Member States the 
power to opt out of an authorization of cultivation given at the EU level, on all or part 
of their territory. The second tier is still at the first stage of the legislative procedure. 
Proposal COM(2015) 17749 intends to extend the same ‘opt-out’ clause to the use of 
GM food and feed authorized under Regulation 1829/2003.50 
 
The most obvious difference between the Norwegian and EU legislation is the 
function of the social assessment. Under the GTA, it is systematic and as important as 
the safety assessment. Under the new Package, the social assessment is optional. It 
does not require the EU authorities to broaden the basis of their decisions, which can 
still address only safety issues. Societal issues are therefore seen as a marginal 
concern, to deal with at the national level, by the Member States inclined to do so. 
 
Furthermore, even when a Member State is so inclined, Directive 2015/412 suggests 
that an open debate on the matter should be avoided. Rather, Article 26(b) gives 
priority to a procedure organizing the ‘consensual’ adjustment, by the applicant, of 
the geographical scope of an application under assessment. Member States can 
demand to exclude parts or all of their territory from the final decision. The applicant 
can decide to confirm the original scope. When he abstains from doing so or consents, 
the territorial adjustment is enacted. 
 
This procedure of ‘voluntary adjustment’ reveals an underlying assumption: public 
authorities must abstain, as much as possible, from limiting the economic freedoms of 
actors involved in risky activities. An explicit reflection on the limits to economic and 
technological freedoms is seen as entailing political and litigation risks. This is why, 
in a way familiar to the EU’s administration, the debate is diverted towards a 
negotiated alternative.51 The priority is to obtain the consent of the applicants, which, 
in a way, privatizes the final decision. Not only does it give the applicants an 
opportunity to adapt their strategy at an early stage, but it also limits the risk for 
public authorities because the final result can no longer be framed as a public 
limitation of economic freedom.52 
                                                
49 Commission Proposal, n. 10 above. See also the Joint Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee 
of the Regions of 22 April 2015, Reviewing the Decision-making Process on Genetically Modified 
Organisms, COM(2015) 176. 
50 Under Regulation 1829/2003, the procedure is carried out at the EU level, where the EFSA is in 
charge of the risk assessment. The grounds chosen by the Member States must therefore not conflict 
the risk assessment conducted by the EFSA. See Regulation 1829/2003/EC of 22 September 2003 on 
Genetically Modified Food and Feed, [2003] OJ L268/1. Regulation 1829/2003 created a ‘one-door, 
one-key’ system by accepting applications for both the use of GM food or feed and their cultivation, 
normally authorized under Directive 2001/18. As a result, most of the applications are now placed 
under Regulation 1829/2003; see <http://gmoinfo.jrc.ec.europa.eu/gmc_browse.aspx>. Proposal 
COM(2015) 177 might therefore have a significant effect on the system, whereas the already adopted 
adopted amendment might not be so revolutionary. This is one of the reasons why the proposal is so 
controversial, and debated so intensely in the European Parliament that it might be abandoned. 
51 See A. Roger, ‘La Transplantation des Accords Environnementaux dans l’Ordre Juridique de l’Union 
Européenne – Le Modèle Contractuel Hollandais Revisité’, in: M. Hautereau-Boutonnet (ed.), Contrat 
et Environnement: Etude de Droit Interne, International et Européen (PUAM, 2014), Chapter 23. 
52 Proposal COM(2015) 177 does not contain a mechanism for voluntary adjustments (and neither did 
the first version of Directive 2015/412). However, the legislative process might lead to alignment with 
Directive 2015/412. Indeed, the Member States might favour a (more) consensual path to limit the 
political and legal risk of having to justify an opt-out decision. 
  
The rationale of the optional nature of the social assessment and of this ‘voluntary 
adjustment’ finds its roots in the compromise between the satisfaction of some 
Member States’ demands for reform on the one hand and the desire to maintain the 
status quo on the other. The Package offers Member States an additional ‘safeguard’, 
but explicitly aims at protecting the functioning of the internal market and at 
providing predictability to the market actors. It also aims at preserving, as much as 
possible, the pre-existing procedures and improving their application.53 
 
The pre-existing decision-making procedures are indeed kept intact. As their details 
are now well known,54 the following will focus on their main features. Even though 
the procedures organise a multi-level governance system, their implementation has 
always ended up at the EU level, with a safety assessment conducted by the European 
Food Safety Authority (EFSA).55 However, the opinion of the EFSA has never 
brought Member States to a common position at the EU level.56 As a result, the 
Commission has been left with the final word, which in practice has been an 
enactment of the (always positive) EFSA’s opinion. The Package does not change this 
system; it only hopes that a sufficient majority for authorizing GMOs will now be 
achievable, since Member States have a broader possibility to opt out at a later 
stage.57 
 
Because the Package intends to preserve the existing procedures and the free 
movement of goods, it submits the possibility to opt out to several conditions. First, 
the Package states that the national measures ‘shall, in no case, conflict with the 
environmental risk assessment carried out pursuant to this Directive or to Regulation 
(EC) No 1829/2003’.58 This condition aims at protecting the EFSA from national 
intrusions by defining the grounds which cannot be invoked by Member States. It 
therefore leaves the question of what they can be quite open. Neither Directive 
2015/412 nor proposal COM(2015) 177 provide an exhaustive list of what could be a 
legitimate compelling ground, although the Directive contains an indicative list.59 
According to this list, Member States can rely on grounds related to ‘socio-economic 
                                                
53 Commission Proposal, n. 10 above, recital 6, states it very clearly. Like Directive 2015/412, the aim 
of the proposal is primarily to smoothen the procedures at EU level. It is ‘intended to provide more 
predictability to operators and limit the recourse by the Member States to the safeguard clauses 
provided for in Article 23 of Directive 2001/18/EC and 34 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003. It [is] 
also expected that those amendments would have a positive impact on the decision-making process for 
the authorisation of GMOs for cultivation.’ 
54 See, e.g., M. Lee, n. 4 above; and M. Lee, n. 8 above. 
55 The EFSA is competent to conduct the safety assessment under Regulation 1829/2003. Under 
Directive 2001/18, the Member State to which the application is sent first conducts the safety 
assessment and proposes a decision, which is communicated to all Member States and the Commission. 
If these actors do not agree on the decision – and they never have – the case is brought for a final 
decision at the EU level by the Commission, which has always asked the EFSA to give a positive 
opinion on the GMO safety. 
56 Gathered in the competent committee for the first step of the procedure, or in the Council (now 
‘appealed committee’) for the second. 
57 The former (limited) possibility to opt out on safety grounds, which has been used by several States, 
is also maintained. 
58 Directive 2015/412, n. 9 above, Article 26b(3); Commission Proposal, n. above, Article 34(a). 
59 The list is indicative as Directive 2015/412, n. 9 above, Article 26b(3) states: ‘based on compelling 
grounds such as those related to: ...’ (emphasis added). Regulation 1829/2003 does not contain such a 
list, but it has been conceived as an extension of the Directive. Therefore, the guidance of the former 
will probably be relevant to the latter. 
 impacts’, ‘environmental policy objectives’, ‘land use’, ‘town and country planning’ 
or ‘agricultural policy objectives’ and, ‘public policy’, which can only be invoked in 
association with another ground. These grounds, broadly formulated, seem to leave a 
considerable margin of appreciation to Member States. 
 
Furthermore, in addition to invoking a legitimate ground which does not conflict with 
the European assessment, Member States will also have to demonstrate that their 
measure respects the other, more severe, conditions set by both texts of the Package. 
The opt-out has to be reasoned. Article 26b of Directive 2015/412 and Article 34a in 
proposal COM(2015) 177 also state that opt-out has to be ‘in conformity with Union 
law’, proportional60 and non-discriminatory.61 These three conditions are an implicit 
but very clear reminder of Member States’ obligations under internal and/or 
international trade law.62 It is not certain whether a restriction on the right to cultivate 
GMOs on one’s territory would be seen as a restriction to trade.63 However, it is very 
likely that somebody who intends to challenge an opt-out will invoke trade law to 
support his claim. If the measure is indeed seen by Courts (national or European) as 
impairing the free movement of goods, the Member States will have to demonstrate 
that they meet the conditions to legally do so.64 The exact margin of appreciation for 
Member States under the new Package read in conjunction with trade law is a 
complex issue, which deserves a detailed analysis which cannot be conducted within 
the limits of this article.65 The existing literature on the derogations to free circulation 
                                                
60 Member States will have to clearly explain not only that the means fit the aim, but also that the 
pursued objective could not be attained by less restrictive measures. Depending on the scrutiny of the 
Courts, their control might lead to finding Member States in breach of their obligations, especially for 
bans that Member States intend to apply nationally rather than locally. See CJEU, Cases C-452/01, 
Margarethe Ospelt and Schlössle Weissenberg Familienstiftung, [2003] ECR I-09743; and C-192/01, 
Commission of the European Communities v. Kingdom of Denmark, [2003] ECR 2003 I-9693. 
61 The non-discrimination test might easily be passed if GMOs and non-GMOs as or in products are 
considered different. European Commission, Complementary Considerations on Legal Issues on GMO 
Cultivation Raised in the Opinions of the Legal Service of the Council of the European Union of 5 
November 2010 and of the Legal Service of the European Parliament of 17 November 2010, 
SEC(2011) 551. However, the debate might not be as straightforward under WTO law. 
62 Article 216.2 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) submits Member 
States to the international agreements concluded by the EU, including the WTO agreements. 
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, [2012] OJ C326/47 
(‘TFEU’), Article 216.2. The Commission refused to see WTO law as a barrier. See European 
Commission, Complementary Considerations on Legal Issues on GMO Cultivation Raised in the 
Opinions of the Legal Service of the Council of the European Union of 5 November 2010 and of the 
Legal Service of the European Parliament of 17 November 2010, SEC(2011)0551. But Member States 
nevertheless expressed legitimate concerns. See Council of the European Union, Press Release 
7478/12, 3152nd Council Meeting, Environment (9 March 2012). Furthermore, the national opt-outs 
might also be challenged under the other trade obligations of the EU, for example bilateral treaties. 
63 Its impact would be indirect and probably very limited if the restriction does not cover the whole 
territory. This seems to be the position of the Commission. See European Commission, Considerations 
on Legal Issues on GMO Cultivation Raised in the Opinion of the Legal Service of the Council of the 
European Union of 5 November 2010, SEC(2010) 1454, at 11. Arguably, the Commission seems even 
to be willing to extend the de minimis rule to the free movement of goods. Even in this case however, 
the Court of Justice of the European Union could still qualify the opt-outs as measures having an effect 
equivalent to a quantitative restriction on imports and a broader restriction might very well be more 
contentious under internal and/or international trade law. See M. Geelhoed, n. 16 above. 
64 According to the conditions of Article 36 of the TFEU, n. 62 above. 
65 But see M. Lee, n. 16 above. See also N. de Sadeleer, EU Environmental Law and the Internal 
Market (Oxford University Press, 2014); and M. Geelhoed, n. 16 above. 
 obligations can be used as a useful starting point in the matter.66 For the purposes of 
this article, it suffices to acknowledge that the Member States might perceive trade 
law as a political and legal risk in the design of their opt-out policy and that they will 
have to carefully explain the nature, necessity and coherence of their measures. 
 
The Norwegian GTA clearly pursues a single aim: steering agro-biotechnology 
innovations towards sustainable development. The Package aims at three potentially 
conflicting aims: preserving the functioning of the market, improving the application 
of the decision-making procedures and broadening the assessment of GMOs to social 
concerns. The potential tensions are well illustrated by the scope of the Package. 
Indeed, even if proposal COM(2015) 177 is adopted, the Member States would not 
have control over the presence of GMOs on their territory: the circulation of GM 
food, feed and seeds will still have to be left free.67 In practice, the Member States 
who opt out will therefore have to bear the risk of spillage and unauthorized use 
associated with free circulation. Similarly, a State which opts out, but which is 
surrounded by GMO-cultivating countries, will have to face a risk of contamination. 
A high compliance cost might have to be paid if just a few States decide to opt out.68 
 
Because of the tension resulting from competing objectives, it is uncertain whether 
the Package will result in a more holistic approach of what is in the public interest or 
in further delaying the (re)coupling of physical expertise with a political judgement 
on the social value of GMOs. The competing objectives open the way for various 
interpretations, with varying degrees of ambition. Settling on one might very well 
depend on the underlying assumptions of the text. 
 
NORWAY AND THE EU: DIFFERENT UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS 
 
Our comparative analysis reveals different conceptions of GMOs and of the role of 
public authorities in their governance. The opposition to GMOs in Norway is strong. 
The Norwegian biotechnology industry is quite weak and its lobbying cannot compete 
with the influence of the associations opposed to GMOs.69 Furthermore, Norway’s 
climate restrains the attractiveness of its fields, and the size of its market is of limited 
interest. This social and physical context probably contributed to the consolidation of 
the assumptions underlying the regulation: GMOs should not be released unless there 
is a good reason to do so (i.e. they do not present any physical or social risk and/or 
they are needed by society). The role of public authorities is to steer sustainable 
innovation, by addressing the question ‘is the GMO answering a societal need better 
than available sustainable alternatives?’ The focus is therefore on the realization of 
the policy objective, i.e. sustainable development and sustainable agriculture. 
 
                                                
66 See M. Lee, n. 4 above; see also L. Moore Smith, n. 16 above; S. Poli, ‘Continuity and Change in the 
EU Regulatory Framework on GMOs, after the WTO Dispute on ‘Biotech Products’’, 37:2 Legal 
Issues of Economic Integration (2010), 133, at 137; N. Thayyil, Biotechnology Regulation and GMOs. 
Law, Technology and Public Contestations in Europe (Edward Elgar, 2014); N.N. Shuibhne and M. 
Maci, ‘Proving Public Interest: The Growing Impact of Evidence in Free Movement Case Law’, 50:4 
Common Market Law Review (2013), 965; M. Lee, n. 8 above, at 84. 
67 This is a huge difference with Norway. However, Member States will be able to engage in a social 
assessment of not only all living GMOs, as under the GTA, but also of processed GM food and feed 
which is currently not allowed under Norwegian regulation. 
68 See L. Moore Smith, n. 16 above. 
69 See G.K. Rosendal, 2003, n. 14 above; G.K. Rosendal, 2007, n. 14 above. 
 At the EU level, public opinion is much more divided, with some countries strongly 
in favour of GMOs (e.g. Spain, the Netherlands) and some strongly opposed (e.g. 
Austria, Hungary). The potential market is very attractive and the preservation of the 
free movement of goods is one of the core raisons d’être of the EU. The pro-GMO 
lobbies are accordingly generously endowed and very active. The regulation therefore 
logically, but not necessarily rightly, is built on different assumptions than the 
Norway’s. EU regulation assumes that GMOs should benefit from the free movement 
of goods except when they are reasonably suspected as harmful; the question whether 
they are needed is ignored. From this perspective, the public authorities’ role is to 
contain the harm potentially caused by GMOs while disrupting, as little as possible, 
the functioning of the market. To do so, they have to answer the question: does the 
GMO have a worse impact than the most commonly used alternatives? This is 
obvious when looking at the EFSA’s risk assessment policy. The EFSA uses 
conventional agriculture as a benchmark,70 even though it officially recognizes the 
‘high diversity’ of agriculture models in its guidance documents.71 The focus is 
therefore on the functioning of the internal market and on the smooth functioning of 
the EU procedures. It is also on preserving the status quo for environmental and 
health protection, which is regarded as satisfactory even though ‘the unsustainability 
of the green revolution shows it will not be the model for future agriculture.’72 
 
Despite these differences, could Member States draw inspiration from the Norwegian 
model in implementing the Package? 
 
LEARNING FROM NORWAY’S INNOVATIONS: THE POTENTIAL 
BARRIER 
 
As discussed above, the two most original and ambitious features of the Norwegian 
model are the scope of the assessment, including global and long-term effects, and the 
‘best sustainable alternative’ test. The new Package is presented by the Commission 
as a measure of de-harmonization; Member States regain the power to adopt a 
                                                
70  See COGEM, Socio-economic Aspects of GMOs. Building Blocks for an EU Sustainability 
Assessment of Genetically Modified Crop (COGEM, 2009); Convention on Biological Diversity, 
‘Summary Report on the Survey of the Application of and Experience in the Use of Socio-economic 
Considerations in Decision-making on Living Modified Organisms (UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/BS/COP-
MOP/5/INF/10, 17 September 2010); and A. Spök, n. 8 above. For examples of this practice, see: 
EFSA Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs), ‘Applications (EFSA-GMO-RX-MON810) 
for the Renewal of Authorisation for the Continued Marketing of (1) Existing Food and Food 
Ingredients Produced from Genetically Modified Insect Resistant Maize MON810; (2) Feed Consisting 
of and/or Containing Maize MON810, Including the Use of Seed for Cultivation; and of (3) Food and 
Feed Additives, and Feed Materials Produced from Maize MON810, all under Regulation (EC) No 
1829/2003 from Monsanto, 1149 EFSA Journal (2009), 1; and Panel on Genetically Modified 
Organisms (GMOs), ‘Opinion of the Scientific Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms on a Request 
from the Commission Related to the Notification (Reference C/ES/01/01) for the Placing on the Market 
of Insect-tolerant Genetically Modified Maize 1507, for Import, Feed and Industrial Processing and 
Cultivation, under Part C of Directive 2001/18/EC from Pioneer Hi-Bred International/Mycogen Seeds, 
181 EFSA Journal (2005), 1. 
71 EFSA Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO), ‘Scientific Opinion on Guidance for Risk 
Assessment of Food and Feed from Genetically Modified Plants, 9:5 EFSA Journal (2011), 1, at 70. 
72 D. Quist et al., ‘Hungry for Innovation: Pathways from GM Crops to Agroecology’, in: European 
Environment Agency (ed.), Late Lessons from Early Warnings (European Environment Agency, 2013), 
458. 
 national policy on the matter. But to what extent? Could they decide to develop a 
system inspired by the Norwegian approach? 
 
The answer depends on the interpretation of the conditions that Member States need 
to respect when exercising their competence. As explained above, the most obvious 
potential barriers are trade law and the necessity to provide evidence for the need and 
proportionality of the measure, even though these requirements leave space for 
interpretation. A less obvious and equally difficulty and predictable constraint is the 
clause which delimits the respective competences of the EU institutions and Member 
States. The Package specifies that national measures ‘shall, in no case, conflict with 
the environmental risk assessment carried out pursuant to this Directive or to 
Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003’.73 
 
A strict separation between the realms of social and safety assessment could pose a 
threat to a State willing to find inspiration in the Norwegian model. Indeed, the 
Norwegian experience shows how interlinked the social and physical dimensions of 
GMOs are. Determining the socio-economic impact of GMOs, for example, requires 
an understanding of their physical impacts. Questioning whether the GMO is the best 
sustainable alternative involves a potentially deeper intrusion in the realm of safety. 
Indeed, the performance and physical impacts of the GMOs have to be known, as well 
as those of their alternatives. Similarly, addressing the intra-generational equity 
implications of the release requires knowledge on their impact in the producing, 
neighbouring or importing countries. This interconnection has not caused issues in 
Norway, even though the country is, like EU Member States, subject to a competence 
clause which aims at protecting the unity of the (European) safety assessment. The 
Decision adding Directive 2001/18 to the EU law applicable to Norway under the 
EEA Agreement inserted a provision which states that: 
 
[t]he Contracting Parties agree that the Directive only covers aspects relating 
to the potential risks to humans, plants, animals and the environment. The 
EFTA [European Free Trade Agreement] States therefore reserve the right to 
apply their national legislation in this area in relation to other concerns than 
health and environment, in so far as it is compatible with this Agreement.74 
 
However, this clause did not constitute a strict obstacle because it exists alongside a 
‘safety’ safeguard clause that is much more flexible than the one available to the 
Member States if they want to depart from the EFSA’s assessment. The EEA decision 
states that Norway should have the possibility to restrict the circulation of a GMO if it 
has ‘detailed grounds’ for considering a risk for health of the environment. This 
restriction can be permanent, and might be discussed in the EEA joint committee. 75 
On this matter, the EEA agreement harmonizes Norwegian and EU law, but to a far 
lesser degree than within the EU, where Member States have a higher threshold to 
meet when using the safety safeguard of the Directive or Article 114 TFEU.76 An 
                                                
73 Directive 2015/412, n. 9 above, Article 26b(3); Commission Proposal, n. 10 above, Article 34(a). 
74 Decision of the EEA Joint Committee, n. 12 above, Article 1, inserting Article 23(c). 
75 See O.K. Fauchald, n. 14 above; Decision of the EEA Joint Committee, n. 12 above, Article 23. 
76 The EU GMO regulation’s legal basis is TFEU, n. 62 above, Article 114. When Member States want 
to derogate from the harmonized measures adopted at the EU level, they have to respect either the 
conditions set by the Directive itself or the even stricter conditions set by the general safeguard clause 
detailed by Article 114.5 TFEU: ‘if, after the adoption of a harmonisation measure by the European 
 intrusion of Member States in the topics covered by the EFSA mandate is therefore 
less acceptable under EU law than under the EEA agreement. It is therefore important 
to determine the extent of Member States’ leeway under the new provision. 
 
The competence clause allows Member States to consider issues explicitly excluded 
from the EFSA mandate: the ‘ethical and socio-economic aspects’77 of the cultivation 
and use of GMOs. Other ‘purely’ social issues, for example religious concerns, could 
also be accepted if sufficient evidence of their relevance can be provided. However, it 
is less certain whether the clause also allows Member States to venture into dealing 
with social issues deeply connected with physical ones. 
 
The answer depends on the way the clause prohibiting ‘conflicts’ between the 
national measures and the European safety assessment is interpreted. Interpreted 
strictly, it could involve a complete exclusion of Member States from questions 
dealing directly or indirectly with safety. Some elements of the Package encourage 
this interpretation. The recitals of Directive 2015/412 and proposal COM(2015) 177 
affirm that it is necessary ‘to avoid any interference with the competences which are 
granted to the risk assessors and risk managers’78 under Regulation 1829/2003 and 
Directive 2001/18. Directive 2015/412 further specifies that this would be done by 
using grounds ‘distinct from and complementary to those assessed according to the 
harmonized set of Union rules’,79 whereas the proposal adds that the solution would 
be to use grounds ‘not related to risks to human and animal health and to the 
environment, as those are already assessed at Union level’.80 
 
In addition, recital 15 of Directive 2015/412 refers to a report of the Commission 
which also points towards a strict interpretation.81 This report is indeed limited to 
socio-economic impacts, i.e. the impacts on production and consumption patterns. It 
ignores wider social concerns, such as the distribution of advantages and burdens of 
GMOs or their societal benefits. The cultural or ethical dimensions of GMOs are 
similarly set aside by the report. 82  In the context of the Directive, such an 
interpretation would considerably constrain the scope for reform. It would exclude the 
most contentious social issues, which are always intertwined with the safety 
assessment of GMOs, as shown by the Norwegian experience. 
                                                                                                                                      
Parliament and the Council, by the Council or by the Commission, a Member State deems it necessary 
to introduce national provisions based on new scientific evidence relating to the protection of the 
environment or the working environment on grounds of a problem specific to that Member State 
arising after the adoption of the harmonisation measure, it shall notify the Commission of the 
envisaged provisions as well as the grounds for introducing them.’ 
77 See, e.g., EFSA Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO), ‘Guidance on the Environmental 
Risk Assessment of Genetically Modified Plants, 8:11 EFSA Journal (2010), 1879; and EFSA Panel on 
Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO), ‘Scientific Opinion on Guidance for Risk Assessment of 
Food and Feed from Genetically Modified Plants, 9:5 EFSA Journal (2011), 2150. 
78 Directive 2015/412, n. 9 above, recital 14; Commission Proposal, n. 10 above, recital 10. 
79 Directive 2015/412, n. 9 above, recitals 13-14. 
80 Commission Proposal, n. 10 above, recital 7. 
81 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council of December 2008 on 
Socio-economic implications of GMO Cultivation on the Basis of Member States Contributions, as 
Requested by the Conclusions of the Environment Council, found at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/food/plant/gmo/reports_studies/docs/socio_economic_report_gmo_en.pdf> 
(‘Report from the Commission’). 
82 Even though Directive 2001/18 already mentioned ethical issues as a matter reserved for the Member 
States. 
  
However, several Member States denounced the narrow scope of the report, and some 
Member States advocated the Norwegian model in response to the questionnaire used 
in preparing the report.83 Furthermore, the narrow interpretation does not seem to fit 
the breadth of the legitimate grounds listed by Directive 2015/412. If, as authorized 
by the Directive, Member States are using grounds related to their environmental, 
agriculture or land-use policy, social and safety issues will necessarily be tightly 
connected. In addition, recital 14 of Directive 2015/412 also leans towards a more 
flexible interpretation when it provides the ‘maintenance of local biodiversity, 
including certain habitats and ecosystems, or certain types of natural and landscape 
features, as well as specific ecosystem functions and services’ as an example of 
legitimate ground. Finally, the wording of the competence clause accommodates more 
flexible interpretations: requiring an absence of ‘conflict’ is not excluding Member 
States from any question related to the physical impacts of GMOs; it simply asks for 
their action to be compatible with the EU decision. 
 
This more flexible interpretation opens up new possibilities for Member States. First, 
Member States could be allowed to use the information present in the EU risk 
assessment to translate the safety data in social terms. This would take into account 
the interconnection of issues, without authorizing a ‘conflict’ with the EFSA 
assessment. For example, a reference to a more targeted protection against pests 
might mean less yield loss for farmers, and therefore more economic gains and 
available biomass; an identified risk of increasing resistant pests or super weeds might 
lead to yield loss, or threaten the maintenance of agricultural models which do not 
rely on chemical inputs. The power of Member States would then be to identify the 
social impacts linked to the GMO characteristics identified at the EU level. They 
would then be free to rank the burdens and benefits according to their values as well 
as their environmental and agricultural policies. For example, some Member States 
may consider that saving carbon dioxide emissions by not using tillage (a possibility 
with Bt84 GM plants) is a benefit compensating for the increase in pest resistance or 
for the difficulty of maintaining non-GMO chains. 
 
However the significance of the competence clause is less clear when the EU risk 
assessment does not provide the physical data related to the specific concern of a 
Member State. May a Member State act upon social concerns grounded on physical 
impacts not covered by the EU risk assessment? Such an interpretation could be 
accepted, even though it is pushing the boundary further. When a Member State 
includes an issue not covered by the EFSA in its assessment, national authorities 
would examine safety issues, but would not create a ‘conflict’ with the EU process 
that ignored the question. This would, for example, allow a Member State to consider 
the impact of the cultivation of a GMO imported but not grown in the EU if proposal 
                                                
83 See Commission Report, n. 81 above, at 5, as well as the detailed contributions from the Member 
States. France is a clear example of a country denouncing the restrictive framing. See Haut Conseil des 
Biotechnologies, ‘Réaction du Comité Économique, Éthique et Social au “Questionnaire Socio-
économique” Proposé par la Commission Européenne’ (2010), found at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/food/plant/gmo/new/reports_studies/contribution_en.htm>. 
84 Bacillus thuringiensis or Bt, bacterium used as pesticide. 
 COM(2015) 177 is adopted85. Indeed, the EFSA considers this question as being 
outside its remit. 
 
More controversially, could a Member State invoke grounds closely related to safety 
concerns that the EFSA mentions, but does not fully examine? Again, since the safety 
issues are not exhausted by the EFSA, the national measure would not per se conflict 
with the European one; it would just deal with physical impacts which were not 
assessed. Recital 14, which accepts the preservation of local biodiversity as a 
legitimate ground for opting out, corroborates this view. The EFSA sometimes 
mentions local conditions but does not examine in detail the specificities of each 
particular region in which a GMO could be cultivated. This interpretation would also 
allow Member States to compare the assessed GMO to other available sustainable 
options, which is encouraged by recital 14 of Directive 2015/412 authorizing the 
States to promote ‘the maintenance and development of agricultural practices which 
offer a better potential to reconcile production with ecosystem sustainability’. Finally, 
this flexible interpretation should be preferred because the alternative would give a 
disproportionate power to the EFSA. The agency would have the power to exclude 
Member States from regulating an issue without thoroughly assessing it. The example 
of a Member State which would like to apply a ‘best sustainable alternative’ test to a 
GMO event illustrates this point well. Such a test touches upon two aspects covered 
by the EFSA mandate. The first one is the selection of the benchmark against which 
GMOs are evaluated, knowing that the EFSA uses conventional agriculture and not 
the most sustainable alternative available. The second potential ‘overlap’ is the 
analysis of whether the use of a GMO brings changes in management practices. It is 
part of the EFSA mandate,86 even though its opinions do not always analyse this issue 
in depth. 
 
The last potentially contentious point in the interpretation of the competence clause 
concerns whether the existence of scientific uncertainties could have an impact on the 
extent to which the related issue might be considered as harmonized. This is a crucial 
point in light of the considerable uncertainties remaining regarding the physical 
impact of some GMOs, in particular in the long term. Is it possible to consider that 
when the conclusions are clouded by uncertainty, the EFSA opinion does not exhaust 
the question, meaning that the Member States are allowed to differ in their 
appreciation of the acceptability of the risk according to their social and political 
contexts? Does the risk management decision adopted at the EU level in that case set 
a minimum level of harmonization, leaving Member States free to adopt a more 
precautionary approach towards uncertainty? As this would equal authorizing 
Member States to adopt another definition of what is ‘safe’, this is highly improbable. 
                                                
85 This would be in line with several environmental actions of the EU, which has been keen on 
expanding the influence of its environmental regulation in other contexts. See J. Scott, 
‘Extraterritoriality and Territorial Extension in EU Law’, 62:1 American Journal of Comparative Law 
(2014), 87. Examples include the EU’s Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade programme, 
its biofuels regulation or its (now suspended) decision to extend the EU’s emissions trading schemeto 
international flights. See J. Scott and L. Rajamani, ‘EU Climate Change Unilateralism’, 23:2 European 
Journal of International Law (2012), 469. However, Member States might be limited by trade law on 
this matter. See M. Dougan, ‘Minimum Harmonisation and the Internal Market’, 37:4 Common Market 
Law Review (2000), 853. 
86 Directive 2001/18/EC, n. 12 above, Annex II C.3. 
 Indeed, the Directive and the Proposal reaffirm the importance of preserving a 
‘uniform high level of protection of health, the environment and consumers’.87 
 
However, if Member States are not able to adopt a more precautionary approach, 
several changes at the EU level are required. First, the EFSA should explicitly 
mention the degree of uncertainty associated with its evaluations, in order to leave 
space for debate on the acceptability of the risk. Second, it requires greater inclusion 
of factors other than safety not only at the national level, but also at the EU level by 
the representatives of the Member States involved in comitology decisions and by the 
Commission. Indeed, the very purpose of the risk management phase is to develop a 
political appreciation of the risk, not to give a legal seal of approval to the results of 
the risk assessment. If the political acceptability of uncertainties cannot be discussed 
at the national level, it has to be done at the European level. Not only does Regulation 
1829/2003 allow the Commission to integrate concerns beyond safety, but policies 
related to GMOs command the EU institutions to do so.88 Although the social impacts 
of GMOs are often best assessed at a local level since they depend on the cultural, 
political, physical and social context of a given territory, several social issues related 
to GMO use and cultivation are common to all States and should be discussed at a 
higher level of governance.89 Finally, it has been demonstrated that responsible 
innovation is better steered as far upstream as possible.90 
 
Thus, the Package should not be seen as a form of de-harmonization, not least 
because it is not clear whether social concerns were actually harmonized before.91 On 
the contrary, it could be implemented as an opportunity for all the authorities involved 
in the EU GMO multi-level governance system92 to finally engage in a more holistic 
approach to public interest in GMO policies. This perspective would enrich the 
system by both allowing a more comprehensive management of the integration of 
GMOs in society and, in the spirit of subsidiarity, increasing respect for the various 
political viewpoints of the Member States. The challenges of this process should not 
be forgotten; nevertheless, the Norwegian experience helps to anticipate one of the 
main problems that the actors will face when assessing the social impacts of GMOs: 
                                                
87 Directive 2015/412, n. 9 above, recital 2, also referred to in Commission Proposal, n. 10 above. 
88 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Life Sciences and Biotechnology. A Strategy for 
Europe, COM(2002) 27, at 18, suggesting that ‘life sciences and biotechnology should be developed in 
a responsible way in harmony with ethical values and societal goals’. It also suggests that 
biotechnologies should address ‘society’s needs’ related to ‘health …, food and the environment and to 
sustainable development’, within the EU and globally. Ibid., at 9. This is confirmed by the objectives 
of the Common Agriculture Policy; see Regulation 1305/2013/EU of 17 December 2013 on Support 
for Rural Development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and 
Repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005, [2013] OJ L 347/387, containing 54 occurrences of 
‘sustainability’ or ‘sustainable’, and see in particular recitals 4-5 and Article 4. Finally, see Council of 
the European Union, Conclusions 16882/08,(5 December 2008). 
89 For example, the impact of intellectual property rights on bottom-up innovation is a common issue, 
as is the oligopoly of a handful of firms over the production of seeds and associated chemical inputs. 
The co-existence of production is in a similar situation. 
90 R. Owen, P.M. Macnaghten and J. Stilgoe, ‘Responsible Research and Innovation: from Science in 
Society to Science for Society, with Society’, 39:6 Science and Public Policy (2012), 751; see also R. 
Owen, J. Bessant and M. Heintz, Responsible Innovation (John Wiley & Sons, 2013). 
91 See M. Lee, EU Environmental Law, Governance and Decision-making, 2nd edn (Hart, 2014), at 234. 
92 M. Lee, ‘Multi-level Governance of GMOs in the EU: Ambiguity and Hierarchy’, in: M. Cardwell 
and L. Bodiguel (eds.), The Regulation of GMOs: Comparative Approaches (Oxford University Press, 
2010), 101. 
 the lack of data. 
 
LEARNING FROM NORWAY’S DIFFICULTIES: LACK OF DATA 
 
Understanding the social dimension of the integration of GMOs in society is a 
complex and resource-intensive process. However, neither the amended Directive 
2001/18 nor Regulation 1829/2003 requires the applicant to provide the authority with 
relevant social data. The NBAB suffered from this data gap when examining whether 
the European authorization should be rejected for the Norwegian territory. The 
Norwegian market is not considered interesting enough to convince the applicants to 
provide the supplementary information not required by EU regulation, even after 
repeated demands by the authorities. 93  The new Package also does not oblige 
applicants to provide supplementary information, and might therefore lead to a 
situation where Member States may face similar challenges. The problem is acute 
since the literature does not offer sufficient material for an extensive social 
assessment. Social data is plagued, as is physical data, by ignorance 94  and 
uncertainties. 95  Most research involves farm-level studies, focused on yield 
performances96 and a strong funding bias has been identified.97 Overreliance on these 
studies could therefore distort the final result of the social assessment. Furthermore, 
the GMO Package does not promote future improvement of the situation, because it 
does not require the applicant to monitor social impacts, but only safety concerns. 
Finally, the quality and depth of the social assessment very much depend on the 
integration of safety and socio-economic analyses. To be useful, safety data needs to 
be articulated through criteria which can be used for the purpose of the social 
assessment.98 For example, the toxicity of a product needs to be expressed in cancer 
incidence rates, its impact on the soil in terms of fertility, etc. The relative 
performance of agricultural models has to be known. The fragmentation of the 
assessment procedures might become an important obstacle to their effective 
implementation if the EFSA does not adapt its risk assessment policy to the more 
holistic appreciation of what is in the public interest permitted by the new Package.99 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The new GMO Package empowers Member States to engage in a holistic assessment 
of public interest in relation to GMOs. However, EU regulation still seems to perceive 
public authorities only as a ‘guardrail’ against harm. The new Package does not 
change the vision of public authorities’ role, but just allowed to broaden the scope of 
                                                
93 This issue is expressed in the NBAB guidance (NBAB, n. 25 above), but also in nearly all its 
opinions. This forced the NBAB to consider whether the precautionary principle is applicable to the 
social assessment. It answered negatively, worrying that this extension would weaken the principle. 
94 When no data is available. 
95 When the data is not precise, not conclusive enough or heavily debated. 
96 See T. Kaphengst et al., n. 6 above; and Report from the Commission, n. 81 above. 
97 See T. Kaphengst et al., n. 6 above. 
98 A. Péry et al., ‘Perspectives for Integrating Human and Environmental Risk Assessment and 
Synergies with Socio-economic Analysis’, 456-457 Science of the Total Environment (2013), 307; see 
also M. Kritikos, n. 8 above. 
99 The request to update the assessment guidelines of the EFSA might, however, open up an 
opportunity to debate the issue. Directive 2015/412, n. 9 above, Article 3 requires that no later than 3 
April 2017, ‘the Commission shall update the Annexes to Directive 2001/18 … as regards the 
environmental risk assessment, with a view to incorporating and building upon the strengthened 2010 
Authority guidance on the environmental risk assessment of GMOs’. 
 the safeguard which can now be exercised against social harm as well as physical 
harm. On the other hand, Norway’s authorities take on the role of ‘switch operator’, 
guiding technological innovation towards the satisfaction of societal needs in a 
sustainable way. This is quite a difference, but the conflicting aims of the Package 
might open space for an interpretation allowing Member States to get inspiration from 
Norway. 
 
Should they do so? It is sometimes argued that the agro-technologies currently in use 
might present as many risks as GMOs or more, and that GMOs are unjustifiably 
stigmatized.100 Looking at the debate surrounding the risks for pollinators associated 
with neonicotinoid-coated seeds 101  or the endocrine-disrupting effects of some 
herbicides (including the one to which GM crops are tolerant)102 and pesticides,103 this 
implicit preference is indeed confirmed. However, concluding from this that 
regulation of GMOs should be lighter would start a race to the bottom. On the 
contrary, this difference in treatment calls for reinforced scrutiny on the effects of 
available techniques through interdisciplinary monitoring and, if necessary, 
regulation. It is indispensable to learn from the failures of the ‘green revolution’, and 
promote agro-technologies supporting a more resilient, locally adapted and 
environmentally friendly agricultural model. To do so, every opportunity to identify 
and exchange good practices should be seized. 
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100 See, e.g., R. Batista et al., ‘Microarray Analyses Reveal that Plant Mutagenesis May Induce More 
Transcriptomic Changes than Transgene Insertion, 105:9 Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences of the United States of America (2008), 3640. 
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Lines’, 262:3 Toxicology (2009), 184. 
103 A. Kortenkamp et al., ‘State of the Art Assessment of Endocrine Disrupters’  (2011), found at: 
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